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4.1.1  Introduction 
The role of commercial banks in intermediating cross-border financing has 
been fundamentally transformed during the past twenty-five years. The tradi- 
tional international financing role of these institutions as the dominant provid- 
ers of  long-term on-balance-sheet syndicated credits and trade financing has 
during the past ten years shifted toward one in which they are the dominant 
providers of short- to medium-term structured finance. Such “tailor-made” fi- 
nancing is designed to meet a variety of specific cross-border sovereign and 
corporate financing needs, including project and trade finance, bridge finance, 
and liquidity and risk management facilities. Banks’ international financing ac- 
tivities have been supported by the export into local currency markets of their 
expertise in capital markets, trading, and risk management. These changes in 
the type of cross-border financing have coincided with far-reaching changes in 
the way international banks organize themselves and in their menu of products 
and activities. In particular, a more liberal regulatory environment has made it 
possible to exploit obvious complementarities among the areas of  banking, 
security markets, and risk management, which has led to  various types of 
cross-border financing activities-balance  sheet lending, capital market  fi- 
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nancing, off-balance-sheet risk management, and liquidity standby facilities- 
being combined within globally integrated financial intermediaries. Hence, the 
pure commercial bank  of  the  1970s has largely  disappeared  from interna- 
tional markets. 
Section 4.1.2 of this paper reviews the changes in the role of banks in inter- 
national financial flows. Section 4.1.3 discusses forces that are driving the 
changes in cross-border banking. Section 4.1.4 reviews the role of banks in the 
growth of global derivative markets. It also discusses the role of banks in pro- 
viding credit to leveraged players such as hedge funds, and their role in cur- 
rency crises. Section 4. l  .5  discusses the challenges for policy created by the 
transformation of cross-border finance and the emergence of the universal glo- 
bal banking firm.  Section 4.1.6 concludes. 
4.1.2  The Changing Role of Banks in Cross-Border Lending 
The flow of OPEC current account surpluses into deposit liabilities in the 
1970s and early 1980s created the means for banks to play a lead role in inter- 
mediating international financial flows, leaving the direct capital markets rela- 
tively unused by cross-border borrowers. A number of institutional and finan- 
cial market features gave banks a competitive edge, relative to capital markets, 
in the pricing of credit and further promoted a lead role for bank lending (see 
Folkerts-Landau 1985). These included, first, a growing perception during the 
recycling of the OPEC surpluses that financial authorities in the mature mar- 
kets were increasingly ready to protect the deposit liabilities of  large money 
center banks-the  too-large-to-fail doctrine emerged. The cost of deposit lia- 
bilities for banks, therefore, became largely independent of  banks’ choice of 
assets, which provided incentive for banks to expand into new areas of lending, 
particularly as it was combined with low capital requirements. Second, in the 
syndicated loan market, international bank lenders were able to form credible 
coalitions through the use of restrictive loan covenants (cross-default and pari 
passu clauses) that could exert credit discipline by denying delinquent borrow- 
ers access to refinancing in the banking markets. This mechanism raised the 
cost of  default to borrowers, encouraging renegotiation rather than outright 
default on bank debts in the event of borrower distress, leading to the view that 
“countries don’t default.” The higher expected salvage value of bank loans then 
allowed banks to charge lower margins on their loans than was acceptable in 
capital markets without enforcement mechanisms. 
The late 1980s and 1990s witnessed a sea change in the composition of inter- 
national financial flows. In 1980, medium- and long-term syndicated bank loans 
represented the bulk of international lending, accounting for over half-around 
55 percent-of  the total of global international primary market financing flows 
(syndicated loan plus security issuance) (fig, 4.1A). The share of  syndicated 
bank loans then declined steeply, falling to around 20 percent of total financing 
in 1996, while the volume of international bond issuance grew to exceed that 193  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
of syndicated bank loans, accounting for about 30 percent in 1996.l Relative 
to the overall volume of flows, international equity placements have remained 
modest; they accounted for less than 5 percent of total financing in 1996. 
Reliance on bank lending over the period has been greater for emerging 
market borrowers than for those from the mature markets, and the growth in 
importance of direct borrowing from international capital markets has been a 
more recent phenomenon. For emerging market borrowers, medium- and long- 
term syndicated bank lending continued to account for over half of their total 
borrowing through the 1980s, representing 55 percent of  total international 
fund-raising in 1990 (fig. 4.1C). But capital market financing by emerging mar- 
ket entities soared during the 1990s, with bond issuance, for example, rising 
to 40 percent by  1993 and international placements of equity to 10 percent, 
while the share of syndicated bank lending to emerging market borrowers de- 
clined to about 30 percent. It is notable that international placements of equity 
by the emerging markets, reflecting large privatizations of public enterprises, 
have been a more substantial component of international fund-raising than that 
by entities from mature markets. 
As the Mexican peso crisis and subsequent tequila effect caused a deteriora- 
tion in the perceived credit quality of emerging markets in late 1994 and early 
1995, the share of capital market borrowing contracted, and the share of syn- 
dicated bank lending rose again during 1994-95.  Although the share of such 
bank lending fell back again in 1996, to around 40 percent, its share in total 
flows remains sizable and is double that for entities from mature markets. The 
increased recourse to the syndicated loan market during times of credit deterio- 
ration reflects, as it did in the previous decade, the greater ability of banks to 
resolve debt problems flexibly. Furthermore, it also reflects the fact that the 
deterioration in the banks’ own credit ratings means that banks are more likely 
to find it profitable to provide on-balance-sheet financing to borrowers of lower 
credit quality. With the resolution of the crisis in emerging markets, direct bor- 
rowing by  emerging markets on international capital markets once again ex- 
ceeded syndicated bank lending in 1996. 
Across the major emerging market regions, there have been substantial dif- 
ferences in the composition of flows reflecting the differing use of funds in the 
regions (figs. 4.10 and 4.1E). The predominant share of syndicated lending to 
emerging markets in recent years has been to Asian emerging markets, with 
the share of  syndicated lending flows to emerging markets destined for Asia 
rising from around 30 percent in the early 1980s to an average of around 60 
percent during 1993-96.  Asian emerging markets have continued to rely on 
syndicated bank lending as the dominant source of  external primary market 
financing. Since 1993, the share of syndicated bank lending has been relatively 
1. Note that to conserve on words we often use “syndicated loans” to refer to medium- and 
long-term syndicated bank loans, although “short-term” facilities are also syndicated. While the 
former represent actual lending flows comparable to those on capital markets, as discussed below, 
the latter are predominantly credit facilities that may or may not be drawn down. 194  Bankim Chadha and David Folkerts-Landau 
Total  Issuance 






1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  199f 






Mature Market Borrowers 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 









1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1998 
Fig. 4.1  International primary market activity, 1980-96  (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
steady, rising modestly to account for about 50 percent of  total financing in 
1996. The relatively more modest securitization of external primary market fi- 
nancing flows to the Asian region, and the greater reliance of the region on syn- 
dicated bank lending, has reflected the comparative advantage of international 
banks vis-i-vis international bond markets to tailor the features of  credit to 
meet the needs of infrastructure and project finance, which remains the main 
source of demand for external funds in the region. 
Bank loans continue to be critical elements of structured and project finance 
packages, and project finance has been a significant component of international 
bank lending flows over the period, with the ratio of  international project- 195  The Evolving Role of  Banks in International Capital Flows 
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Fig. 4.1  (cont.) 
finance-related lending to medium- and long-term syndicated bank lending for 
all borrowers averaging almost 10 percent between 1980 and 1996 (fig. 4.2). 
Spurred by deregulation, privatization, the greater need for infrastructure, and 
rapid economic growth in emerging markets, project finance has both repre- 
sented a relatively larger ratio of  syndicated bank lending to emerging mar- 
kets-averaging  22 percent over the period-and,  since 1992, accounted for a 
larger share of global project finance than in mature markets. The main driving 
force for these developments has come from Asia, where rapid  economic 
growth put existing infrastructure under strain. During 1994-96 project financ- 
ing to Asian emerging markets exceeded $20 billion a year. 196  Bankim Chadha and David Folkerts-Landau 
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Fig. 4.2  Project financing, 1980-96 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
A notable change in the composition of  financing flows over the period has 
been the rapid growth in importance of loans classified as “short term.” These 
loans are essentially liquidity-related credit consisting of  trade credits, term 
loans with maturities of less than one year, and revolving credits. The share of 
short-term loans in total international financing has risen steadily from around 
20 percent in 1980 to 45 percent in 1996. Since 1985 the volume of such short- 
term loans has in each year exceeded the volume of  medium- and long-term 197  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
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Fig. 4.3  Composition of short-term loans, 1980-96 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
syndicated bank lending, and since 1993 it has been more than double the 
volume of medium- and long-term syndicated bank lending. 
Figure 4.3 details the composition of “short-term” loans, dividing them into 
revolving credits, term loans with maturities of less than one year, buyer cred- 
its, export credits, and “other.” The bulk of international short-term loans for 
entities from mature markets has been in the form of revolving credit facilities 
(90 percent), while short-maturity term loans and buyer and export credits have 
had very modest shares. For entities from emerging markets, revolving credits 198  Bankim Chadha and David Folkerts-Landau 
Fig. 4.3  Composition of short-term loans, 1980-96  (cont.) 
have represented a much more modest share of around 35 percent, while trade 
credits-buyer  and export credits-represented  10 percent of short-term loans 
during 1995-96. 
The rapid growth of credit facilities, and in particular the increasing impor- 
tance of revolving credits, illustrates the changing role of bank lending from 
the provision of medium- and long-term finance to the provision of contin- 
gency finance or liquidity insurance. This growth has been encouraged both 
by the securitization process itself, with contingency finance providing insur- 
ance for the borrower’s debt securities,  and by  the regulatory  advantage of 199  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
lower capital cost to banks for off-balance-sheet financing than for traditional 
on-balance-sheet lending. Contingency finance or lending facilities can take a 
number of forms. A revolving credit facility, for example, is a contract that 
obliges the bank  to provide  funds, on demand, up  to  a certain maximum 
amount and for an agreed period under an agreed interest formula. The bank 
earns an up-front commitment fee for standing ready to lend, whether or not 
such lending actually occurs.2  Such lending represents a backup line of credit 
to the borrower that serves to assure investors in the borrower’s debt securities 
that liquidity will be available to the borrower when the security matures, and 
in the event the borrower has difficulty rolling over these securities on capital 
markets. The insurance provided by the presence of  such facilities, therefore, 
reduces the cost of funds to the borrower on capital markets, with part of this 
difference being earned by banks in the form of commitment fees for the provi- 
sion of the insurance se~vice.~ 
4.1.3  The Forces behind the Change in Cross-Border Bank Lending 
A number of factors propelled the growth of direct capital market borrowing 
and the changing composition of  bank lending toward shorter term and struc- 
tured finance. These changes were largely driven by developments in financial 
markets in the major industrial countries. 
An  important reason for disintermediation from the international banking 
sector into international capital markets was the decline in the credit standing 
of banks in mature markets relative to that of corporate and sovereign borrow- 
ers. The erosion of the asset quality of banks due to the developing country 
debt crisis of the 1980s and country-specific business and credit quality cycles 
in the United States, Europe, and Japan acted to raise the cost of funds to banks 
to the point where sovereigns, public sector entities, and highly rated borrowers 
were increasingly able to obtain financing on capital markets more cheaply 
than could be provided by  banks. The deterioration in the credit quality of 
banks and their present credit standing relative to (potential) borrowers is illus- 
trated most starkly by the number of AAA ratings of banks. Banks have ceased 
to be the highest rated entities, and therefore, their ability to intermediate inter- 
national capital flows across their balance sheets for the high end of the market 
has been increasingly limited relative to direct capital market lending. In the 
view of  all the major credit rating agencies that rate banks-Moody’s,  Stan- 
dard and Poor’s  (S&P’s), and IBCA-the  credit standing of  (major global) 
banks has continued to deteriorate over the past ten years.4 
2. For a listing and discussion of various lending facilities, see Lewis and Davis (1987) and 
Smith and Walter (1997). Lending facilities are also distinguished into “committed facilities” and 
“uncommitted facilities,” which are not legally enforceable and have lower fees. 
3. Rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, e.g., require issuers of commercial 
paper to have such facilities in place. 
4. The following table is from IBCA (1997). This list does not include a number of German 
Landesbanks that have AAA ratings due to a constitutional maintenance guarantee. 200  Bankim Chadha and David Folkerts-Landau 
Number of  AAA 
Banks 
1989  1996 
Moody's  24  3 
SBrP's  10  3 
IBCA  9  5 
Of the twenty-four banks rated AAA by Moody's in 1989, ten have fallen into 
the AA category and eleven into the A category, and by  1996 only three banks 
retained a AAA rating. With the recent downgrade of Union Bank of Switzer- 
land by  S&P's  there is now exactly one major global bank-the  Rabobank 
from the Netherlands-with  a AAA rating from all three agencies. This com- 
pares with nine sovereigns that are universally rated AAA and fourteen corpo- 
rates that earn such a rating.5 
Regulatory changes provided additional incentive for securitizing interna- 
tional syndicated lending. The imposition of risk-based capital requirements 
on banks in the late 1980s forced more precise accounting of how capital was 
used, increasing pressure to charge higher spreads and fees in order to recover 
the increased cost of capital, thereby reducing the competitive  price advantages 
of bank loans. Table 4.1 shows that for most countries the ratio of commercial 
bank capital and reserves to the size of total balance sheets increased over the 
period. For France, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, the capital and reserve 
ratio peaked in 1994, the last year of the sample, rising between 0.9 percentage 
points (Switzerland) and 1.6 percentage points (Japan) relative to 1985. For 
commercial banks in the United States, the capital and reserve ratio peaked in 
1993, having risen a full 2 percentage points above the ratio in 1985. The one 
exception to the general trend of increased capital ratios is the United King- 
dom, where capital ratios increased in the mid-l980s, peaking in  1988, but 
declined 
As the relative credit quality of banks deteriorated, increasing their own cost 
of  funds, and risk-based capital requirements increased the costs of lending, 
the composition of  bank borrowers changed dramatically during  1980-96. 
Governments, public sector entities, and highly rated corporate issuers turned 
away from bank lending and began to borrow directly on international capital 
markets, where they could obtain funding at better rates than banks could offer. 
The share of borrowing on the syndicated bank lending market by  sovereign 
5. The universally AAA rated sovereigns are Austria, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The corporates identi- 
fied  with international  long-term AAA ratings  are Siemens, Hitachi,  Toyota,  Shell, Unilever, 
CIBA, NestlB, Novartis, Marks  and Spencer, Amoco, Exxon, General Electric, Johnson and John- 
son, and Merck and  Company. The count excludes separate subsidiary and joint venture ratings. 
6. The behavior of the aggregate capital ratio in the United Kingdom may reflect differing cover- 
age of  banking sectors across countries-see  the notes to table 4.1. Table 4.1  Composition of Bank Balance Sheets: Capital and Reserves, Securities, and Loans, 1985-94  (percent of year-end balance sheet total) 
Change over  Peak Relative 































































































































Capital and Reserves 
5.7  6.0 
2.4  2.6 
5.2  5.1 
2.9  3.1 
6.3  6.3 
4.8  4.6 
5.4  5.8 
Securities 
10.2  13.2 
10.4  15.9 
12.3  12.4 
11.0  10.8 
11.3  11.8 
7.5  8.5 
15.3  18.2 
Loans 
77.7  75.5 
47.0  47.8 
57.2  60.5 
54.1  57.6 
61.1  63.4 
62.1  60.5 
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-5.4 
Source: OECD (1996). 
Note:  Coverage, extent of consolidation of bank balance sheets, and timing of fiscal years, for which the data are reported rather than the calendar years noted above, 
differ across countries. For Canada and the United Kingdom, the data cover commercial banks. For France, Switzerland,  the United States, Germany, and Japan, the 
data cover the large commercial banks. For details see source. Numbers in boldface are peaks. 
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Fig. 4.4  Borrower mix of medium- and long-term syndicated bank 
loans, 1980-96 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
entities from mature markets fell from around 25 percent in 1980 to below 3 
percent in 1996 and has remained below this level since (fig. 4.4). The share 
of borrowing by private sector entities from mature markets, on the other hand, 
has risen from 45 percent in 1980 to 90 percent in 1996. The composition of 
emerging market entities borrowing on the international medium- and long- 
term syndicated loan market has evolved in a similar manner, though the de- 
cline in the shares of sovereign and public sector issuance occurred later-in 
the 1990s-and  may not yet have run its course. The share of public sector 
entities also remains sizable at almost 30 percent in 1996, while private sector 
borrowing accounted for around 65 percent. 
The decline in the relative credit quality of banks and the regulation-induced 203  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
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Fig. 4.4  (cont.) 
increase in the cost of  leveraging bank capital in lending, which prompted 
banks to shift the focus of their lending activities lower down the credit spec- 
trum in  search of higher yields, are evidenced by  the behavior of  spreads 
charged by  banks. Average interest margins on international medium-  and 
long-term syndicated bank lending, which averaged about 70 basis points dur- 
ing 1980-84,  rose uninterruptedly during the latter half of the 1980s, almost 
doubling to around 130 basis points by  1989 (fig. 4.5). It is notable that the 
sustained increase in interest margins during 1984-89  was accompanied by 
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Fig. 4.5 
syndicated bank loans, 1980-96 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
All borrowers: terms of international medium- and long-term 
have fluctuated during the 1990s, reflecting a host of factors and in particular 
competitive pressures, they have remained at much higher levels than during 
the early 1980s. 
Some of the pressures for securitization have been technical, spurred by ef- 
forts by  the banks themselves to better manage their liquidity and risk expo- 
sures. The move toward capital market borrowing was also facilitated by im- 
proved disclosure standards for borrowers, advances in information technology 
that increased the public availability of information on borrowers, and an ex- 
pansion of the universe of entities rated by international credit rating agencies, 
all of which reduced the value of superior or inside information in conventional 
bank lending contracts. 
The changes in the composition of  international financial flows coincided 
with structural changes in the financial industry. The severe competitive pres- 
sures on banks created by the liberalization of domestic markets-including 
the removal of restrictions on interest rates, the introduction of negotiated bro- 
kerage commissions, and shelf registration-the  shift in individual investor 
preferences away from bank deposits, the cyclical deterioration in the quality 205  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
of  bank balance sheets, and the increased cost of leveraging capital in bank 
lending as compared to participation in direct capital market lending activity, 
in secondary market trading, and in asset management services forced an un- 
precedented wave  of  mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry. The 
easing of restrictions on the lines of business and geographical location and 
operation of financial businesses encouraged consolidation and concentration 
across segments of  the financial industry and  across international borders. 
Spurred in the 1990s by  the ongoing process of  globalization, international 
portfolio diversification, and growing demand for risk management products, 
the universal global banking firm-combining  traditional on-balance-sheet de- 
posit taking and lending with fee-based security market, risk management, and 
asset management activities-has  emerged as the dominant global financial 
intermediary.7 
The decline in the relative importance of traditional bank lending activity is 
reflected in changes between 1985 and 1994 in the relative contributions of 
interest and noninterest income to total commercial bank income, and in the 
shares of bank balance sheets devoted to security holdings and loans. For com- 
mercial banks from Canada, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, there is a clear secular downward drift in the contribution of 
net interest income to total gross income over the period (see table 4.2).*  For 
Canadian and French banks the decline has been particularly sharp, with the 
ratio declining over the period by over 20 percentage points, while it has been 
significant for British and American banks, for whom the ratio has declined by 
a little less than 10 percent. 
The evolution of the share of commercial bank balance sheets devoted to 
security holdings is relatively uniform across countries, with the shares for 
each country increasing over the sample period and peaking in the last two 
years (1993-94)  for which data are available (table 4.1). The increase is more 
notable for Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with 
the  shares for these countries increasing by  between 8  and  13 percentage 
points. The increase has been more modest for Switzerland (5 percentage 
points), Germany (3 percentage points), and Japan (2 percentage points). The 
share of bank balance sheets devoted to loans in each of the countries, with 
the exception of Japan, peaked in 1990-91  and has fallen since by between 3 
percentage points (France) and 10 percentage points (United Kingdom; table 
4.1). In Japan, the share of commercial bank balance sheets devoted to loans 
continued to increase over the period. 
7. On the decline of traditional banking in the United States, see Edwards and Mishkin (1995); 
on the changing borders of banking, see Borio and Filosa (1994) and Bisignano (1997); on the 
evolution of the universal global banking firm, see Smith and Walter (1997); and on the leading 
role played by a limited set of “core” integrated global financial firms, see Group of Thirty (1997). 
8. For the  United States, Edwards and Mishkin (1995) showed that noninterest income from 
fees and trading as a proportion of the total income of American commercial banks rose from an 
average of 19 percent in 1960-80 to 35 percent in 1994. Table 4.2  Relative Contributions to Gross Income of Commercial Banks: Interest versus Noninterest Income, 1985-94  (percent of 
gross  income) 
Change over  Change from 















Net Interest Income 
76.3  75.3  71.7  72.6  70.8  69.1  69.9 
-  -  -  75.1  68.6  66.8  66.8 
51.8  50.3  48.7  52.6  49.7  49.1  48.8 
65.5  63.7  62.6  63.8  62.1  61.1  59.3 
68.0  64.0  62.4  62.7  60.0  59.1  58.3 
68.9  72.5  69.9  68.6  66.4  65.1  71.3 
73.4  75.5  67.8  60.0  62.8  64.1  81.9 
Noninterest Income 
23.7  24.7  28.3  27.4  29.2  30.9  30.1 
-  -  -  24.9  31.4  33.2  33.3 
48.2  49.8  51.3  47.4  50.3  50.9  51.2 
34.5  36.3  37.4  36.2  37.9  38.9  40.7 
32.0  36.0  37.6  37.3  40.0  40.9  41.7 
31.2  275  30.1  31.4  33.6  34.9  28.7 
26.6  24.5  32.2  40.1  37.2  35.9  18.1 
69.0  67.8  55.0  -21.3 
70.6  50.5  55.1  -20.0 
49.9  49.6  45.4  -6.4 
57.5  55.5  56.8  -8.7 
58.3  56.3  59.6  -8.4 
67.6  65.4  70.5  1.7 
94.2  98.8  100.6  27.2 
31.0  32.2  45.0  21.3 
29.5  49.5  44.9  20.0 
50.1  50.5  54.6  6.4 
42.5  44.5  43.2  8.7 
41.7  43.7  40.4  8.4 
32.4  34.6  29.5  -1.7 















Source: OECD (1996). 
Note: Coverage, extent of consolidation  of bank balance sheets, and timing of fiscal years, for which the data are reported rather than the calendar years noted above, 
differ across countries. For Canada and the United Kingdom, the data cover commercial banks. For France, Switzerland,  the United States, Germany, and Japan, the 
data cover the large commercial banks. For details see source. Numbers in boldface are peaks for net interest income and troughs for noninterest income. 207  The Evolving Role of  Banks in International Capital Flows 
Out of these developments has emerged a set of highly competitive interna- 
tional banking firms, almost all headquartered in the G-5 countries, that are 
supported by an effective regulatory, supervisory, legal, and payments and set- 
tlement infrastructure and that have  over the past five years gained a strong 
competitive advantage in international financial intermediation. The choice of 
cross-border financial instrument, ranging from syndicated bank loans to struc- 
tured bank finance to long-term bond or equity finance, is now more likely to 
be made on the basis of  technical financial and economic criteria relating to 
liquidity and risk management concerns. 
Hence, while the organization and the activity mix of global bank intermedi- 
aries has changed significantly in response to changes in the financial environ- 
ment, these institutions have remained key participants in intermediating inter- 
national capital flows. Their strong presence has been supported by  a number 
of factors. First, bank lending remains important as a source of cross-border 
structured finance-custom  tailored to the needs of the international sovereign 
and corporate borrower. The flexibility of international bank lending in draw- 
down and repayment terms remains an important advantage in project and 
bridge finance, as well as trade finance. Similarly, such flexibility of financial 
terms remains important in short-term lending to finance merger, acquisition, 
and leveraged buyout transactions, as well as leverage finance for hedge funds 
and other high-leverage participants in international markets. 
Second, while there has been a decline in the role of medium- and long-term 
syndicated bank lending in global financial flows, money center banks have 
increasingly exploited their comparative advantage as flexible suppliers of li- 
quidity. The growth of foreign currency external liabilities has brought with it 
a growing demand for cross-border contingency financing-backup  lines of 
credit, revolving credits, and standby credit facilities. Much like in the domes- 
tic markets in the United States, banks stand ready to lend when access to 
capital markets dries up temporarily or when the rolling over of  short-term 
international obligations meets with resistance. This suggests a changing em- 
phasis in the role of banks (as lenders) from providers of medium- and long- 
term finance to providers of contingency liquidity finance. 
Third, the development of over-the-counter derivative markets-risk  man- 
agement finance-during  the past ten years has been an important source of 
fee income for internationally active banks. Banks have been able to compete 
effectively with the organized futures exchanges by  supplying hedging prod- 
ucts that are tailored to clients’ needs. Banks have become the main suppliers 
of  derivatives-particularly  swap contracts-used  to modify the risk charac- 
teristics of  international capital flows. Hence, even though banking entities 
have lost some of their advantages in extending on-balance-sheet commercial 
and industrial loans, they remain at the core of  the financial industry, albeit 
embedded in larger financial service firms. 
Fourth, while local restrictions continue to apply in some markets, on a 
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commercial banks have played an important role as underwriters of interna- 
tional security issues, again suggesting an undiminished if evolving direct role 
for commercial banks in the international financial intermediation process. The 
dominance of the global universal banking firms in international primary mar- 
ket finance is apparent from table 4.3.9  The majority of firms in the table have 
significant market share in arranging international loans and in the underwrit- 
ing of debt and equity securities, that is, in both banking and investment bank- 
ing. Three firms-J.  P.  Morgan, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, and Credit Suisse 
First Boston-rank  in the top ten firms in terms of market share in each of the 
loan, bond, and equity subsectors. The table also indicates that the international 
primary market finance industry is heavily concentrated, with the top two firms 
accounting for almost a fifth of business, the top five for a third, the top ten for 
a half, and the top twenty-five firms for 70 percent of the industry. It is also 
dominated by  twelve U.S. firms, which take all five of  the top positions  in 
terms of total market share, represent one-half of the top twenty-five firms, and 
account for almost half (47 percent) of the global market. 
Fifth, banks have not only facilitated the process of securitization, they have 
also become increased proprietary investors in (both domestic and) interna- 
tional securities and foreign exchange. Also, as asset managers and advisers, 
either directly or through their subsidiaries, commercial banks play an impor- 
tant role in the international allocation of funds. 
Sixth, international banks have become key participants in domestic local 
currency markets, not only in emerging markets but also in other industrial 
countries. This internationalization of local currency markets has provided an 
important vehicle for the transfer of  financial expertise in the capital market 
area, in trading, and in market infrastructure (settlement and market making). 
Indeed, internationally active institutions, operating in a well-regulated and su- 
pervised home jurisdiction with strong legal and market infrastructure have a 
major comparative advantage in the intermediation business, and this advan- 
tage is allowing them to make significant inroads into the intermediation busi- 
ness outside the major industrial countries. 
We  have discussed various forces driving the change in the composition of 
international primary market financing flows away from syndicated bank lend- 
ing toward direct capital market lending. We would emphasize, however, that 
there are many similarities between syndicated bank lending and debt securi- 
ties. Syndicated bank lending can, in fact, be characterized as a hybrid between 
traditional bank lending-that  is, relationship and privileged information bank 
lending-and  debt securities. The syndicated bank lending market has many 
features in common with that for debt securities. Risk is shared between a num- 
9. These tables can be, and are, often constructed in a variety of ways, such as full credit to lead 
manager, etc. The proportional credit method adopted here avoids double counting when there is 
more than one lead manager, e.g., and yields measures of industry size comparable to the primary 
market financing flows presented in fig. 4.1. Table 4.3  Global Wholesale Banking and Investment Banking Industry, 1996 
Loans"  Bondsb  Equityb 
Amount  Amount  Amount  Total' 
Bank  Country  Rank  (million US$)  Rank  (million US$)  Rank  (million US$)  (million US$)  Share (%) 
1. Chase Manhattan Bank NA 
2. J. P.  Morgan & Co. 
3. Citicorp 
4. Bank of America 
5. NationsBank 
6. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell 
7. Credit Suisse First Boston 
8. Union Bank of Switzerland 
9. SBC Warburg 
10. Memll Lynch & Co. 
11. Lehman Brothers 
12. Goldman Sachs & Co. 
13. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. 
14. NatWest Markets 
15. BZW 
16. Nomura Securities Co. Ltd. 
17. First Chicago NBD Corp. 
18. ABN-AMRO Bank NV 
19. Sociktt Ctntrale SA 
20. Bank of Nova Scotia 
21. Salomon Brothers Inc. 
United States  1 
United States  2 
United States  3 
United States  4 
United States  5 
Germany  6 
Switzerland  8 
Switzerland  9 
Switzerland  22 
United States  68 
United States  16 
United States  54 
United States  94 
United Kingdom  10 
United Kingdom  7 
Japan  77 
United States  11 
Netherlands  12 
France  20 
Canada  13 


















































































































































(continued) Table 4.3  (continued) 
Bank 
Loans"  Bondsb  Equityb 
Amount  Amount  Amount  Total" 
Country  Rank  (million US$)  Rank  (million US$)  Rank  (million US$)  (million US$)  Share (%) 
22. Bankers Trust Co.  United States  14  24,153  42  2,388  -  0  26,541  1.2 
23. HSBC Group  United Kmgdom  25  10,878  17  11,282  19  807  22,967  1  .o 
24. CIBC Wood Gundy  Canada  15  23,741  47  1,675  -  -  25,416  1.2 
25. ABN AMRO Hoare Govett  Netherlands  -  -  13  18,853  14  1,212  20,065  0.9 
Industry totals  1,500,922  638,989  61,419  2,201,330  100.0 
Top 2 (% of total)  25.5  0.0  0.0  19.4 
Top 5 (% of total)  46.6  7.9  2.4  34.1 
Top 10 (% of  total)  55.5  34.1  30.1  48.6 
Top 20 (% of total)  69.6  57.8  65.5  66.1 
Top 25 (% of total)  73.5  66.8  71.1  71.5 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
Note:  Dashes indicate amounts less than $1 billion. 
'Proportional credit to arranger. 
bProportional credit to book runner. 
'Loans, bonds, and equity combined. 211  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
ber of  participants. Pricing is competitively determined through an auction- 
type format, again involving a number of participants. There is secondary mar- 
ket trading, albeit mostly among a restricted class of  investors, other banks. 
While an informal interbank market for loan participation has existed since the 
inception of the syndicated loan market, negotiability has been aided by  the 
increased use of transferable participation certificates, which allow lenders to 
sell and transfer their shares in a loan and register the change in ownership 
legally. Nearly 20 percent of syndicated loans issued in 1995-96 were transfer- 
able, compared to 3 percent in 1985-86. Finally, since participation in a syndi- 
cate typically involves numerous banks, information regarding the loan con- 
tract is usually public knowledge. 
At least three institutional characteristics distinguish syndicated bank lend- 
ing from capital market financing, however: distinct investor classes for the 
two instruments, allocation of interest rate risk between borrower and lender, 
and the type and severity of restrictions imposed on borrowers in covenants. 
These differences have  affected the relative importance of  the two forms of 
finance in primary market financial flows, and changes in these characteristics 
will drive their future evolution. 
First, participation in syndicated loans and investment in debt securities is 
undertaken by behaviorally distinct investor classes. The primary participants 
in syndicated loans have (so far), of course, been banks. Investors in debt secu- 
rities represent a much broader class of  participants-including  retail inves- 
tors, large institutional investors, and banks. These investor classes are funda- 
mentally distinct both in their appetite for gauging and bearing credit risk and 
in their ability to salvage value in the event of  borrower distress or default. 
Syndicated bank lenders consist of a relatively homogeneous set of  creditors 
credibly able to form coalitions that can impose substantial costs on borrowers 
by denying them access to the international banking market, thus raising the 
cost to borrowers of defaulting to them. In the event of  default, similarity of 
interests among members of the syndicate increases the incentive for coopera- 
tion among creditors. Some of the incentives for cooperation among creditors 
in the event of  default are institutionalized in syndicated lending contracts. 
These include “sharing clauses,” which require that any member of the syndi- 
cate receiving payments from a defaulting borrower share these with members 
of the syndicate who have not received similar amounts, including the proceeds 
of  any litigation. In contrast, due to the relatively large number and diversity 
of  investors in debt securities, and the absence of  contractual incentives for 
cooperation, it is in general much more difficult to develop a common negotiat- 
ing position that is in the collective interest of the bondholders.10  The expected 
salvage value of debt securities in the event of borrower distress is, therefore, 
lower.” 
10. The specific legal rights of international bondholders are determined by the local jurisdiction 
in which bonds are issued and can vary greatly. 
11. Moody’s (1996) reported recovery values during the 1990s (per $100 face value) of $71 for 
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Second, international  syndicated  lending  is  at  floating  rates  of  interest, 
quoted as a spread over some rate representing banks’ own cost of funds, while 
the majority of bonds are fixed coupon bonds. During 1980-96,  for example, 
fixed rate  bonds made up 76 percent of  total  issuance,  floating rate notes 
(FRNs) 19 percent, and convertibles 5 percent. It should be noted further that 
the market for FRNs is dominated-on  both sides-by  financial institutions 
and can, therefore, be thought of as being to a considerable extent an interbank 
market.” Thus the bulk of interest rate risk is borne by the (nonfinancial corpo- 
rate or sovereign) borrower on the syndicated loan market, while it is borne by 
the lender (investor) on bond markets.” 
Third, one of the features of conventional bank lending that distinguishes it 
from direct capital market lending is the lack of public disclosure requirements 
as compared to direct borrowing on capital markets through security issuance. 
This feature of bank lending has survived the transformation from relationship 
to wholesale syndicated lending. The difference in public disclosure has tradi- 
tionally been compensated for by  stronger restrictions imposed on borrower 
behavior in covenants in bank lending-such  as restrictions  on the gearing 
ratio of the borrower and the double pledging of assets as collateral-than  in 
security issuance. 
In our view, the difference in appetite for risk between the two sets of inves- 
tor classes, the relative allocation of interest rate risk between borrowers and 
lenders in the two instruments, and the relatively more burdensome covenant 
restrictions on syndicated loans have naturally strengthened the incentives for 
borrowers to access capital markets directly in “good times” and revert to bank 
borrowing in “bad times,” heightening the role for banks as lenders of “next to 
last resort.” During good times borrowers favor direct borrowing on the capital 
markets, for example through bond issuance, because it typically implies lower 
interest rate risk to the borrower and less burdensome covenant restrictions 
than bank lending. When borrowers face bad times, the lower tolerance for risk 
among investors in capital markets causes the terms of  such lending to shift 
more sharply against borrowers, who then revert to bank lending. As discussed 
above, some of the change in the role of banks from providers of medium- and 
long-term financing to contingency financing has been formalized by the rapid 
growth of  revolving credits and longer term credit facilities. In our view the 
medium- and long-term syndicated lending market also stands ready to extend 
new credit when borrowers face bad times. 
and $34 for subordinated bonds. While these estimates are consistent with our hypothesis, we 
would emphasize that they underestimate the higher relative salvage value of bank loans compared 
to bonds because earlier and more frequent renegotiation of bank loans prevents actual defaults. 
12. Financial institutions accounted for 71 percent of net FRN  issuance in  1995 and 76 percent 
in 1996. Nonfinancial corporate issuers meanwhile accounted for 17 and 13 percent, respectively. 
See Bank for International Settlements (1997). 
13. Banks do bear the more modest interest rate risk between repricing dates. They also bear 
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While evidence for this hypothesis requires examples of good and bad times 
for individual borrowers, the aggregate patterns of borrowing by Latin Ameri- 
can emerging markets during the 1990s boom in capital inflows to the region 
provide support for this view. Figure 4.6 presents quarterly data for external 
primary market financing for Latin America during the Mexican crisis. From 
the upper panel it is evident that despite the sharp contraction in total flows to 
Latin America in the first quarter of  1995, following the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso in December 1994, syndicated bank lending actually rose. The 
lower panel, which plots the shares of bonds, equities, syndicated bank lend- 
ing, and short-term loans, indicates that during the first quarter of  1995, the 
share of international bond and equity issuance from the region reached its 
lowest point in the 1990s, with no equity issuance during the quarter. The share 
of syndicated lending, on the other hand, reached its highest point during the 
1990s, accounting for about 50 percent of total flows. The price response was 
much more severe in bond markets than in loan markets. With regard to pric- 
ing, average spreads  on new medium- and  long-term  syndicated  sovereign 
loans to the region remained unchanged, at a little over 60 basis points, be- 
tween the first quarter of 1995 and the last quarter of  1994.14  In bond markets, 
on the other hand, the stripped yield spreads on Latin Brady bonds rose from 
around 750 basis points in October 1994 to 1,750 basis points in March 1995. 
With regard to prospects for change in the institutional features that distin- 
guish syndicated bank lending from debt security markets, we offer some ob- 
servations. First, a number of new participants-institutional  investors and, in 
particular, insurance companies and mutual funds-have  recently begun to en- 
ter the syndicated loan market as suppliers of funds. As noted, these institu- 
tions have very different appetites for risk because they do not have a base of 
insured deposit liabilities as banks do. Nor are they subject to the same regula- 
tions and supervision. It is still, however, somewhat early to judge how their 
entrance will affect the syndicated loan market, and how it will affect banks. 
Second, competition-among  banks for mandates within the syndicated bank 
loan market, between banks and other financial intermediaries, and between 
the syndicated loan market and capital markets-has  in recent years created 
pressure for the relaxation of covenants on bank lending, bringing them, in a 
sense, closer to those embodied in debt securities. The relaxation of loan cove- 
nants has been most evident at the high-yield end of the market, such as on 
loans to emerging market entities, and in mid-1996, for example, three unse- 
cured loans by Argentine companies were reportedly put up for syndication 
without  any financial covenants (Loan Pricing Corporation, various issues). 
These developments prompted the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Cur- 
rency (1996) to express concerns last year about the relaxation of  lending stan- 
dards to higher risk borrowers. 











External Primary Markets Financing of Latin American Emerging Markets 
(In billions of U.S. dollars) 
Composition of External  Primary Market Financing to Latin American Emerging Markrtr 





Fig. 4.6  Mexican peso crisis, 1993:l-97:2 
Source: Capital Data, Ltd. 
4.1.4  Cross-Border Derivative Transactions 
Arguably the most significant development accompanying the globalization 
of international capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s has been the prolifera- 
tion of  financial derivative products, with profound implications for interna- 
tional capital flows. First, the use of  derivatives has revolutionized the ability 215  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
of participants in international capital markets to unbundle and manage risks- 
interest rate and currency risks and increasingly now  credit risks as well- 
thereby greatly enhancing the attractiveness of cross-border investments. Sec- 
ond, as a ready means for arbitraging differences in funding costs and returns 
across market segments and international borders, derivatives have increased 
pressures for the integration of world capital  market^.'^ Third, by lowering the 
transaction costs of carrying out complicated investment and hedging strate- 
gies, which would otherwise require several transactions in the underlying in- 
struments, derivatives have increased the efficiency  of international capital mar- 
kets. It is interesting to note that out of a total volume of $47 trillion (in March 
1995) of over-the-counter derivative products, $22 trillion, or about half, in- 
volved a cross-border counterparty; hence derivative markets are to a large ex- 
tent international.I6  The enormous volumes measured in terms of notional prin- 
cipal suggest that derivative transactions have in many cases displaced transac- 
tions in the underlying markets, and although the use of derivatives does not 
increase net financing flows, it has been responsible for a massive increase in 
gross flows. Indeed, the extensive use of cross-border derivatives is obscuring 
the meaning of  the traditional capital account categories in balances of pay- 
ments. Existing capital accounts data are likely to be strongly compromised by 
the extensive use of derivatives. Fourth, derivatives are being used extensively 
to circumvent remaining domestic financial regulation in countries, particu- 
larly emerging market countries, and they thereby achieve a closer integration 
of  these markets into the  global market  (see Folkerts-Landau and  Garber 
1998). For example, a bank constrained by regulation from taking on domestic 
equity price risk can acquire a U.S.  government security position and enter into 
a total return swap with an investor who is allowed to buy the equity risk but 
who wants to hold a position in U.S. government securities. An international 
bank will most likely act as principal intermediary. 
Swap contracts represent the predominant and pervasive derivative product 
(see table 4.4). The familiar method by  which swaps provide a ready tool for 
arbitraging funding differentials between markets is that associated with the 
issuance of debt securities. Swaps used in conjunction with international bond 
financing lower the cost of  funding by  exploiting the comparative advantage 
of counterparties in the swap across segments of  international capital markets 
that may exist for a variety of reasons. It is estimated, for example, that Euro- 
bond transactions involving swaps have sometimes made up more than two- 
thirds of new issues (see Smith and Walter 1997). More recently, swaps have 
facilitated the “repackaging” of securities to arbitrage yield differentials across 
15. For evidence on the integration of  world capital markets during the period, see Goldstein 
and Mussa (1993). 
16. These data are based on the Bank for International Settlements survey carried out in March 
1995-see  Bank for International Settlements (1996). They do not conform with the time-series 
data provided in table 4.4,  which are based on reporting by members of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association. Table 4.4  Markets for Selected Derivative Financial Instruments: Notional Principal Amounts Outstanding, 1986-96  (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Instrument  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Exchange-traded instruments 
Interest rate futures 
Interest rate options” 
Currency futures 
Currency options” 
Stock market index futures 
Stock market index options” 
Over-the-counter  instrumentsb 
Interest rate swaps 
Currency swapsc 






















































































































Sources: Bank for International  Settlements, “International Banking  and Financial Market Developments”  (Basel, various issues), and International  Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA). 
“Calls  and puts. 
bData  collected by ISDA only; the two sides of contracts between ISDA members are reported once only. 
<Adjusted  for reporting of  both currencies; includes cross-currency interest rate swaps. 
dCaps, collars, floors, and swaptions. 217  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
investor bases. For example, on the market for emerging market debt, which re- 
mains particularly segmented, issuers have bought and transferred Brady bonds 
to offshore trusts or special purpose vehicles, which have  then issued asset- 
backed securities in Germany, where demand for emerging market credit de- 
nominated in deutsche marks has been particularly strong. By swapping the 
income from the Brady bonds into deutsche mark, the investor can lock in the 
yield differential. 
International banking  firms  are  the  main  suppliers of  over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives, particularly swap contracts. Relatively scarce before 1980, 
cross-border swaps and their family of  related products (forward swaps, col- 
lars, caps, swaptions) and transactions have come to represent a substantial 
component of international financial market activity. Banks have a natural de- 
mand for swaps to take advantage of swapping opportunities across their loan 
books, as a means of lowering funding costs, in managing funding gaps, for 
improving lending profits, and in managing interest rate and currency expo- 
sures from their loan or investment portfolios. Banks are also naturally posi- 
tioned as counterparties in derivative transactions through their ability to sup- 
ply liquidity to this market when needed. 
Global derivative markets have grown exponentially over the past decade 
(table 4.4-based  on reporting by  members of  the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association). This has been the case for both exchange-traded and 
OTC products, though the flexible customized nature of  OTC contracts and 
regulatory advantages have led to the increasing concentration of  activity in 
the OTC market. According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the Bank 
for International Settlements in early 1995, the notional value of  outstanding 
OTC derivative (including foreign exchange, interest rate, equity, and com- 
modity) contracts totaled $47.5 trillion (after adjusting for double counting and 
including estimated gaps in reporting) at the end of March 1995 (see Bank for 
International Settlements 1996). About 98 percent of this total was accounted 
for by interest rate derivatives ($28.9 trillion) and currency derivatives ($17.7 
trillion). In addition to OTC derivatives, intermediaries who were involved 
in the survey reported that they were engaged in a further $16.6 trillion of 
exchange-traded derivatives. In aggregate, therefore, respondents to the survey 
(from twenty-six countries) revealed that (after adjusting for double counting) 
they were involved in about $64  trillion, by  notional principal, of  derivative 
contracts. To put this in perspective, the aggregate market value of  all bonds, 
equity, and bank assets in Japan, North America, and the fifteen EU countries 
totaled $68.4 trillion at the end of  1995, which is only about 7 percent larger 
than the size of derivative markets as measured by the above survey. 
We  would emphasize two other roles of banks that stem from their being the 
primary providers of credit to the international financial system, which have 
fundamentally altered its operation and the dynamics of financial crises. First, 
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the capital of high-risk, high-return investors, such as the macro-hedge  funds, 
proprietary traders, and risk-tolerant mutual funds, imparting an aggressive 
speculative bent to a formidable quantity of international capital flows. Regis- 
tered offshore (Bermuda, Cayman Islands), macro-hedge  funds are subject 
only to the regulatory requirements in the markets in which they operate and 
are not subject to the disclosure and fiduciary regulation customary in the ma- 
jor capital markets. These funds are increasingly able to circumvent local pru- 
dential restrictions through the use of  off-shore derivative transactions. It is 
estimated that speculative macro-hedge funds have about $100 billion under 
management. With an average leverage ratio of about ten, their total resources 
exceed $1 trillion. Without such leverage the impact of this new investor class 
in global financial markets would be more limited. 
Second, banks play a key role in exchange rate crises, with obvious severe 
implications for capital flows. Speculation against a currency requires domes- 
tic currency credit, either implicitly (off balance sheet) or explicitly (on bal- 
ance sheet), and banks are the major source of this credit. Speculation against 
a currency can be carried out directly by taking a position on the forward mar- 
ket-selling  the currency forward-typically  to a domestic bank as counter- 
party, who then bears the investor’s credit risk, and the forward contract repre- 
sents an implicit or off-balance-sheet extension of credit. As the domestic bank 
then hedges its position, entering into an offsetting transaction with the central 
bank or acquiring foreign exchange on the spot market, these transactions cre- 
ate pressures for the forward and spot rates to depreciate and for domestic 
interest rates to rise. Settlement of  forward sales of  a currency by  a foreign 
speculator also typically involves the extension of domestic currency credit. 
Speculation against a currency can also be carried out by  the use of  explicit 
domestic currency credits that, when converted into foreign currency, create a 
short position in the domestic currency. The conversion of domestic currency 
credit into foreign currency represents a capital outflow, placing downward 
pressure on the spot exchange rate, and to the extent that these pressures are 
offset by central bank intervention, they result in a loss of reserves. Derivatives, 
such  as  structured and  equity-linked notes,  increase the channels through 
which leveraged positions can be taken against the domestic currency (see 
Garber and La11 1998). 
4.1.5  Policy Challenges 
Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises 
The concentrated nature of syndicated debt holdings has been helpful in the 
resolution of international sovereign debt problems. History has amply demon- 
strated that the likelihood of achieving a negotiated debt workout and the pro- 
vision of additional liquidity funding, without debilitating legal attachment of 
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higher in the syndicated loan market than in international bond markets. Dur- 
ing earlier periods of  high capital mobility-in  the nineteenth century and 
the interwar years-when  international flows predominantly took the form 
of  bond finance, free rider problems among bondholders made the provision 
of new money, which required large numbers of  diverse individual investors 
to go along, difficult, and outright defaults were common (Eichengreen and 
Portes 1989; Eichengreen 1991). The readjustment of defaulted debts involved 
protracted negotiations that were complicated by the multiplicity of bondhold- 
ers and by  uncertainty about their representation, often requiring up  to  a 
quarter-century to complete. Furthermore, the fact that trade finance was pro- 
vided by the banks, while long-term loans were extended by individual inves- 
tors, separated the interests of the creditor groups and severely restricted the 
sanctions that bondholders could bring to bear against defaulting borrowers. 
Hence, the recent shift, or reversion, from bank to bond finance is likely to 
have made future debt crises more protracted and severe, unless better mecha- 
nisms can be found to achieve speedy and orderly workouts in international 
bond markets. 
Regulatory Challenge 
The emergence of a small group of highly innovative, adaptive, and competi- 
tive global banking institutions poses a major challenge to banking and securi- 
ties supervisors. These institutions intermediate-on  and off balance sheet- 
a significant portion of  total international cross-border flows. They have the 
ability to book transactions in jurisdictions with low tax and regulatory restric- 
tions. Their overall net firmwide exposures are difficult for supervisors to as- 
sess. The concern, therefore, is that these international institutions still lean 
heavily on the public sector financial safety net without being effectively con- 
strained in their risk-taking activities. 
The recent restructuring of the Basle risk-weighted capital requirement to 
allow for greater use of firms’ own risk management models in arriving at reg- 
ulatory capital requirements is removing a distortion from the risk-taking be- 
havior of  the firms, but whether capital requirements based on value at risk 
(VAR) models sufficiently restrict aggregate risk taking by international banks 
is an open question. Indeed, one might ask whether capital requirements that 
are sufficiently high to force banks to internalize the negative externalities of 
a solvency crisis-that  is, pricing the financial safety net efficiently-might 
not make banking so unprofitable as to force most if not all banking business 
into nonbank financial institutions. 
Derivatives 
The already extensive and still growing practice of using cross-border deriv- 
ative transactions to circumvent domestic financial regulation is contributing 
to the  integration of  emerging market  countries and the smaller industrial 
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speed of  deregulation away from policy authorities. It also raises prudential 
problems, since banks in these countries use derivative transactions with inter- 
national banks to circumvent domestic prudential restrictions on their leverage 
and risk positions. In the absence of  sophisticated risk management systems 
such position taking may undermine the stability of the domestic financial sys- 
tem. It is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid this problem, except to make sure 
that the domestic supervisory and regulatory architecture is sufficiently strong 
to ensure the integrity of the domestic financial system (Folkerts-Landau and 
Lindgren 1997). 
Exchange and Financial Crises 
International banking firms are the main providers of leveraged finance to 
highly leveraged macro-hedge  funds. These funds have been heavily involved 
in taking leveraged positions when there is reason to believe that asset prices, 
including exchange rates, are out of line with underlying fundamentals. Al- 
though such pressure may be useful in forcing an adjustment in prices, it fre- 
quently  precipitates  adjustment  far more rapidly  than  might be considered 
optimal. The question, therefore,  arises whether  the  financing extended to 
high-leverage speculative position takers can, or should be, restricted through 
prudential regulation in the interest of international financial stability. 
4.1.6  Conclusions 
The international financial system is undergoing a major structural change, 
with the emergence of a small set of globally active financial firms, which have 
captured a large part of the international intermediary business. The composi- 
tion of financial flows is shifting from medium- and long-term syndicated bank 
lending to greater direct capital market financing, and bank financing is shift- 
ing toward shorter term structured finance, including off-balance-sheet contin- 
gent liquidity and risk management finance. These changes have been driven 
by a deterioration of bank creditworthiness, increases in regulatory capital re- 
quirements, and significantly greater competition from nonbank financial insti- 
tutions. 
These developments have made the workout of sovereign debt difficulties far 
more difficult, and hence they have increased the potential disruptive impact of 
such crises. The evolving environment also poses major regulatory challenges. 
Is and can the financial safety net still be adequately priced without greatly 
diminishing the size of the banking business as it currently operates? Interna- 
tional financial institutions have been the main suppliers of leverage finance 
for the speculative macro-hedge  funds, thereby raising the issue of  whether 
such financing is contributing to greater volatility in international markets. 221  The Evolving Role of Banks in International Capital Flows 
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2. Mewyn King 
At the annual IMF and World Bank meetings, there is intense competition to 
produce the most bland official pronouncement. Following an economic crisis, 
countries face “policy challenges.” There are several policy-challenged govern- 
ments around the world, and international capital movements seek them out. 
Such capital movements are large. Net private sector capital flows to emerg- 
ing markets in 1997 will, in all likelihood, exceed $250 billion. That is around 
1 percent of world GDP, a not insubstantial figure. Those flows have increased 
substantially over the past decade. And many of them involve banks. But as the 
paper by Chadha and Folkerts-Landau illustrates, the role of banks has been 
diminishing. Bank-intermediated flows this year are sharply down over 1995 
and 1996, especially to Asia. As Chadha and Folkerts-Landau argue, “The pure 
commercial bank of the 1970s has largely disappeared from international mar- 
kets.” Nevertheless, banks, and the health of the banking system more gener- 
ally, are central to the diagnosis of the causes of the recent crises, such as that 
in Thailand, and have played a major part in the discussion at this conference. 
At the risk of being too provocative, I want to pose three questions. First, 
are we in danger of focusing too much on banking supervision of individual 
institutions-which  is rapidly becoming the mantra of international meetings 
of officials-rather  than on an analysis of the risk exposure of  the banking 
system as a whole? Second, should we not focus on the net risk exposure of a 
country’s financial system as a whole rather than simply the banking system? 
Third, how should we think about and organize any international lender-of- 
last-resort facility? 
Banks can be dangerous institutions. They engage in massive maturity trans- 
formation. Borrowing  short and lending long can be a good way  to make 
money. But it is also risky. A large enough capital base can provide some insur- 
ance against the risk of a run on an individual financial institution. That is why 
banks are prudent-the  good ones by choice and the bad ones at the invitation 
of the regulator. But when the financial system as a whole hits trouble, a num- 
ber of banks, indeed the system as a whole, may  find themselves unable to 
meet the demands of their creditors, and a major financial crisis ensues. That 
is usually bad news for taxpayers. All finance ministries should carry a sign 
saying “Banks can be dangerous to your wealth.” 
All this is fairly obvious. But the issue is normally discussed in a domestic 
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common theme to almost all of the international financial crises that we have 
seen in the era of floating exchange rates involves a crisis of the banking sys- 
tem. Or, to be more precise, it involves a crisis of institutions with significant 
mismatch-of  either maturities or currencies. 
At  one level, the solution is straightforward. Sound banking supervision 
combined with an international lender of last resort should both minimize the 
risk of a crisis erupting and provide a means of dealing with it when it occurs. 
And over the past two or three years significant progress has been made in ex- 
tending both elements of the safety net. The Basle Committee, working in as- 
sociation with a number of emerging market countries, has enunciated twenty- 
five core principles for banking supervision, and the resources of the IMF have 
been significantly increased (with its new Emergency Financing Mechanism 
and the creation of the New Arrangement to Borrow-EFM  and NAB, respec- 
tively), enhancing its ability to act as an international lender of last resort. But 
the question that should concern us all is the moral hazard that results. By 
that I do not mean that the borrowers themselves-sovereign  borrowers in this 
context-are  likely to pursue significantly inferior macroeconomic policies as 
a result of the existence of the IMF, although the recent suggestion of an Asian 
Monetary Fund creates doubts in my mind that a regional body would impose 
such tight conditionality as can a less political international body such as the 
IMF. No, the real moral hazard is that of the lenders. Are international capital 
markets lending to emerging markets or to the G-lo? 
In the domestic context, the classic statement of the lender-of-last-resort  role 
was provided by Bagehot (1873): “In time of panic it [the central bank] must 
advance freely and vigorously to the public out of the reserves. . . .  These loans 
should only be made at a very high rate of  interest. This will operate as a 
heavy fine on unreasonable temerity and will prevent the greatest number of 
applications by persons who do not require it.” The key principle is the willing- 
ness of the central bank to lend freely against good collateral. Where the pro- 
posed collateral takes the form of marketable securities, it is easy to calculate 
the appropriate degree of collateral that should be provided. But where collat- 
eral takes the form of illiquid loans and investments in nonmarketable assets, 
a central bank rarely has the opportunity to value with any precision the collat- 
eral offered. Rather, lender-of-last-resort support becomes a public investment 
to reduce the risk of a systemic crisis. But if the lenders know that the authori- 
ties will step in whenever such financial institutions-mainly  banks-get  into 
trouble, then there is little incentive to price such loans appropriately. 
To remove the moral hazard requires a way of  penalizing the creditors in 
such a situation. As a matter of public policy we have not been very successful 
in ensuring that lenders suffer some of  the loss. Deposit insurance is often 
extremely generous in the case of domestic banking systems. And internation- 
ally, the various rescue packages have protected the investments of foreign in- 
vestors who lent to either governments or the domestic banking system in for- 
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in several instances, such as Thailand recently, the domestic banks borrowed 
short to invest in rather dubious long-term assets such as speculative real estate 
ventures. Second, lending in foreign currency protected the overseas investors 
from a consequence of a crisis that led to a sharp fall in the exchange rate. In 
contrast, investors who put their money into the equity market did indeed lose 
a great deal, because of both the fall in the equity market and the change in the 
exchange rate. 
The mere existence of international rescue packages creates a moral hazard 
for lenders. Investors are encouraged to channel funds to emerging markets via 
forms of investment that are more likely to receive assistance. Following the 
Mexican crisis, the G-10 set up  a working party  to produce proposals that 
would convince private sector markets that bond finance was not underwritten 
by  the G-10. Plans for workouts of private bond finance were published and 
put forward for discussion by the market. They have largely been ignored. And 
over the past two years secondary market spreads on international bonds have 
fallen significantly. Spreads on Brady bonds have halved, and in some cases 
have more than halved. Even with a widening of spreads on some Asian bonds 
following the flotation of  the Thai baht, spreads on bonds in other regions 
continued to decline. In Thailand many of the overseas investors were able to 
lend in foreign currency, and their investments have been underwritten by the 
international rescue package. In those circumstances it is not surprising that 
the true risk is not priced into private sector loans. That encourages excessive 
short-term capital flows. 
Many of these crises are associated with, or exacerbated by, banking crises. 
One of the main lessons of the background papers is that in too many parts of 
the world the banking system is weak. For example, in their background papers 
Sebastian Edwards (chap. 1.1) shows that the Chilean crises of  1982-83  and 
the Mexican crisis of  1994 were associated with problems in the banking sys- 
tem and Peter Garber (chap. 7.2) shows that the Mexican banks had little incen- 
tive to price Tesobono risk properly. The conventional conclusion, and indeed 
the universal recommendation of  all official meetings in recent years, is that 
banking supervision must be improved. Although I would not wish to argue 
that supervision should be less rigorous, is it not time to ask whether the im- 
plicit government guarantee is not itself an important part of the cause of the 
problem because of the moral hazard created? 
There is only one logical end to continuing increases in the degree of bank- 
ing supervision-and  that is public ownership of the banks. It is simply unreal- 
istic to expect supervisors to regulate all capital transactions unless they end 
up managing the institutions themselves. And even then the managers seem to 
have difficulty controlling what goes on. Are we expecting supervisors to per- 
form the impossible? Perhaps the time has come to consider whether or not 
governments should step back somewhat from the regulation of  such a wide 
swath of the financial services industry. 
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high degree of maturity transformation associated with the banking system is 
not a free good. Undoubtedly it conveys benefits. But it certainly involves costs. 
Some risks faced by  banks are subject to the law of large numbers. Some de- 
fault risks and the risk of individuals withdrawing deposits because they need 
cash may  be uncorrelated. But important risks are highly correlated. These 
include the impact of the business cycle on default risk, the impact of changes 
in interest rates on values of  long-term assets, and the risk of having to refi- 
nance short-term liabilities at different interest rates. In the era of global capital 
movements with flexible exchange rates and much greater competition be- 
tween financial intermediaries, volatility and risk are higher. Banks no longer 
have large margins protected by oligopolistic positions with which to rebuild 
capital after an adverse shock. As Martin Hellwig has written persuasively, we 
have  paid too little attention to the risks of  the system as a whole and too 
much to those of individual institutions. Suppose, for example, that each bank 
borrows at a given maturity and lends at a maturity of only one year greater. 
The regulators may feel that there is rather little maturity transformation being 
undertaken by  any given individual institution. But with forty banks in the 
system, short-term call money can be transformed into a forty-year mortgage 
on real estate. The banking system helps to reallocate risks among agents in 
the economy, but those risks have in the end to be borne by  somebody. The 
monetary authorities need to understand the nature and size of those risks. To 
quote Hellwig (1995): “The interest rate risk exposure of the system as a whole 
is not visible to the individual institution unless it knows that it is but an ele- 
ment of a cascade and that credit risks in the cascade are correlated.” Hence 
the focus on banking supervision misses an important aspect of the authorities’ 
responsibility for financial stability. It is important to assess the net position 
of  the financial system vis-A-vis the rest of  the world. Looking at individual 
institutions is not enough. Information of that kind, especially with respect to 
currency and maturity exposure of  the system as a whole, would have been 
helpful in the case of the Mexican crises, and no doubt the same applies in the 
case of Thailand and will apply in the case of future crises. 
At  the recent IMF meetings in Hong Kong, the G-10 started to ask itself 
what we could do to reduce the moral hazard associated with the existence of 
government intervention in financial markets. That was not just a comment on 
the crises in Thailand, or even on the Mexican crisis and the prospect of other 
international crises in the years to come. It was also a reflection on the role of 
intervention in our domestic financial system. In an era of free capital markets, 
it is essential that flows of capital move at prices that reflect the risks involved 
and are not underpriced because of the belief that the government will step in 
and rescue failed institutions. As Stanley Fischer argued at the meetings, the 
private sector must bear some of the costs of the risk involved. That requires a 
careful analysis of the sources of the moral hazard. The large number of credi- 
tors means that it is difficult to impose costs on bondholders. That lay behind 
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can involve a moral hazard if the public sector underwrites the banking system, 
although in some cases, such as the debt crises of the 1980s, it is possible to 
impose losses if  the number of banks involved is not too large. In  contrast, 
equity holders bear the full cost of losses. So attention needs to be focused on 
the flows of bond and bank finance. 
I shall leave for discussion the three questions I posed at the outset. But one 
conclusion is clear. Any measures that reduce the need for the public sector to 
intervene in the event of  a financial crisis would reduce the extent of  moral 
hazard. The aim should be to reduce the externalities arising from a financial 
crisis. Two measures would help in this respect. First, the promotion of real- 
time gross settlement systems for payments and settlements would reduce the 
potential knock-on effects of any given institution failing. Second, the conta- 
gion that we have seen in financial markets from one country to another in the 
wake of both the Mexican and Thai crises might be reduced by  improving the 
information flow about policies that are followed in the countries that might 
be at risk. Transparency and disclosure can help to reduce contagion. It was 
appropriate for the IMF to ask Thailand to publish its forward book revealing 
the extent of the central bank’s foreign exchange exposure. But it is hard to see 
how the G-7 can lecture other countries on the need for transparency if they 
themselves do not provide a lead. My own government has set an example by 
deciding to publish Britain’s foreign exchange reserves, both spot and forward. 
Hitherto the forward book was kept secret. 
It is perhaps somewhat incautious of me to break the central bankers’ union 
rules by  arguing both that banks can be dangerous institutions and that clar- 
ity and transparency is a good thing. But as Bagehot observed in his classic 
Lombard Street, “Many years since, I remember seeing a very fresh and nice- 
looking young gentleman, and being struck with astonishment at being told 
that he was  a Director of the Bank of England. I had always imagined such 
Directors to be men of tried sagacity and long experience, and I was amazed 
that a cheerful young man should be one of them. I believe I thought it was a 
little dangerous.” 
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In addressing the topic of the evolving role of banks in international capital 
markets, I would like to deal with an issue we’ve not yet discussed-the  effect 
of  technology. Financial technology, in the form of  front-end analytics and 
back-office processing, has truly revolutionized the banking role. 
First-this  is in no particular order-technology  has forced dramatic de 
fact0 regulatory change by redistributing the information advantage that the 
classic commercial bank intermediary enjoyed. With this resource taken away 
from banks, regulatory change had to occur, or banks would have gone out of 
business. In the United States, the breakdown is most noticeable between bank- 
ing and securities activities. Globally, it’s happening among banking, securi- 
ties, and insurance. 
Over the course of this conference, we’ve heard banks described as both ob- 
solete and dangerous-an  awful combination. But it’s true. What many of us 
grew up thinking of as the traditional role of banks-to  intermediate credit on 
the balance sheet-is  simply not a worthwhile activity on a wholesale basis in 
any developed market, despite the implicit subsidy provided to commercial 
banks by the various guarantee systems to which Mervyn King just referred. 
The second result of technology advances, securitization, has already been 
mentioned. We  now have the technology to make the enormous computations 
necessary to securitize anything from mortgage-backed securities to commer- 
cial loans to the royalty rights to David Bowie’s songs. Indeed, one could argue 
that in the future all financial assets-and  a great many nonfinancial assets- 
will be securitized, which has profound implications for the financial system 
and the global economy. I will return to this later. 
Third, technology has permitted the exponential growth of derivative mar- 
kets. This also has profoundly changed and even enhanced-or  so bankers like 
to think-the  role of banks because derivatives allow financial intermediaries 
to aggregate, segment, and distribute risk, as opposed to assets, on an effective 
basis. I will argue in a moment that derivative markets enable the financial 
system and its banking component to lower the aggregate risk in the economy, 
whether at a national or international level, by permitting investors to diversify 
their portfolios more effectively, along the efficient frontier. 
So these three effects-massive  regulatory change, a securitization process 
that is becoming ever more efficient, and growth in derivative markets-have 
changed the role of banks in the evolving international markets. 
Traditionally, banks recycled assets across their balance sheets in a manner 
that  was  visible  and  controllable and  could  be regulated by  governments 
and central banks. But now we have three types of banks that we need to con- 
sider. 
The  first, which  was  described in  the  excellent paper  by  Chadha  and 
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risk intermediation  function. This kind of bank does much more than take depos- 
its and make loans; it also provides advisory services, makes proprietary invest- 
ments in debt and equity, and acts as an underwriter and agent in debt and equity 
transactions and as a counterparty in derivative markets. In effect, a universal 
bank is an extremely efficient agent for allocating capital and risk. Universal 
banks include not just the obvious names, such as DMG, Chase Manhattan, and 
CSFB,  but all of the global securities firms, which now, as apractical matter, per- 
form the same functions as a result of the breakdown in regulatory barriers. 
The second category of banks is the one we have talked about a great deal 
with respect to Thailand and Mexico: primarily local and importantly retail. 
Such a bank is not a global asset allocator but rather an intermediary between 
saving and investment in the domestic market and between external and do- 
mestic markets. We  have been focusing on the second role, in which a local 
Thai or Mexican bank may engage in maturity or currency transformation by 
funding itself in international markets to finance local activities such as real 
estate investment. 
The third category-and  perhaps the one with the greatest influence-is  All 
Other. All Other has one significant characteristic; namely, All Other is not 
regulated. All Other includes obvious entities such as hedge funds and less ob- 
vious entities such as governments themselves playing a role as investors. But 
the enormous swings in capital flows facilitated by the first category, universal 
banks, and sometimes channeled through the second category, the local inter- 
mediaries, often represent the investment decisions of All Other, the unregu- 
lated. The fact that they are unregulated, and therefore can be highly leveraged, 
accounts for many of the issues discussed this morning. 
Let’s return to the change in role of traditionally defined banks: intermediat- 
ing risk, not assets. The new role means banks need less economic, as opposed 
to regulatory, capital because of the securitization process. And they will need 
even less capital in the future. Instead, they will facilitate the transmission 
mechanism between financial events in a particular geographic sector and oth- 
ers, or between particular asset classes. To  the extent that there is any true 
economic linkage, those effects are transmitted in a nanosecond across markets 
as a result of  the efficiency of  these global institutions and, primarily, their 
derivative activities. 
The implications for the financial system are highly positive. The growth in 
derivative markets lowers aggregate risk and allows banks to manage them- 
selves in a more prudent manner, thereby requiring a smaller cushion of cap- 
ital. Derivative markets have  another very important characteristic: they in- 
crease the transparency of the pricing of assets and liabilities. Both assets and 
liabilities can now be segmented according to their economic characteristics. 
The options embedded in them are stripped out and distributed to the natural 
holder of such a position or to the one for whom it has greatest value because 
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Another effect of derivative markets is that, almost by definition,  they reduce 
the cost of capital. On a secular basis, the cost of capital is declining because 
of the more efficient distribution of risk in the financial system. Some even ar- 
gue that the lower cost of capital accounts for the otherwise inexplicable heights 
equity markets have reached in some developed countries. 
In essence, the effect of securitization is to turbocharge the influence of de- 
rivative markets in lowering the cost of capital. Capital not only costs less but 
earns greater returns because it is no longer a static concept of a certain amount 
of capital applied to a certain amount of assets. In the future, capital will pri- 
marily be used to support the intermediation process: the acquisition of assets, 
their segmentation into appropriate risk pools, and their distribution. So you 
need less of it; it has lower costs; and it provides greater returns. 
These factors increase rather than decrease the stability of  the system. This 
is the only point where  I would respectfully take issue with  Chadha and 
Folkerts-Landau’s paper, which argues that, as a result of  a move from bank 
financing to capital market financing, there will be greater risk, or greater se- 
verity, in future crises. 
I would, as a counterpoint, suggest that when a crisis erupts, whatever the 
reason, a cost occurs at that time. That cost can be recognized immediately or 
it can be recognized later. But what the derivative and security markets do is 
enable the cost to be crystallized immediately, thereby reducing the severity of 
any crisis and accelerating the institution of policies needed to rectify whatever 
the problem was in the first place. In general, these markets are a positive 
element but are considered threatening because they diminish the importance 
of governments, central banks, regulators, and multinational agencies. It is not 
rescue packages but the ability of the markets to crystallize cost immediately 
that leads to effective reform. In short, markets are better arbiters of  stable 
growth policies by individual countries. Not only that, the technologically in- 
duced advances in the banking function allow markets to fulfill that role in an 
ever more efficient way day by day. Evidence of this can be seen in the conver- 
gence of the risk-adjusted real rates of return. It’s not that we have a single real 
rate of return. Instead, the real rates of return adjusted for risk are converging 
on a global basis-a  function of  the greater efficiency and speed in the bank- 
ing system. 
Of course, there is the old saw about how you can’t fight the markets. In an 
exchange rate crisis, the markets are on one side and a central bank on the 
other, and eventually the markets beat the central bank. But that’s yesterday’s 
story. Today’s  story suggests that the markets have even greater power:  the 
power to force regulatory authorities, broadly defined, to recognize that many 
existing forms of regulation are simply outdated. The markets circumvent them 
or force reform, so that the notion of regulation in an institutional framework 
as opposed to a functional framework is being destroyed. 
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pursue an independent monetary policy in the context of a fixed or semifixed 
exchange rate and free capital flows. Something has to give, and what the in- 
creasing speed of the transmission mechanism through the universal banks and 
the All Other has done is essentially force governments to adhere to policies 
that are market sensitive. 
Moeen Qureshi made the point that the primacy of floating exchange rates 
was a dangerous concept or something to be avoided when you are actually in 
power and have  political responsibility. I would respond: That’s the whole 
point. The markets are not going to allow people to make those political trade- 
offs. If they do, they’ll be overwhelmed. 
There are two risks. One of them is that the speed of the transmission mecha- 
nism can also turbocharge the effect of a shock in one geographic area or one 
asset class and create unintended results where there isn’t a true economic link. 
I subscribe to the classic argument about markets overshooting. They do over- 
shoot. And they correct very quickly. This doesn’t mean there aren’t going to 
be crises, but rather that even a crisis induced by  overshooting, as Arminio 
Fraga argues is happening in Indonesia, is undesirable but will correct very 
quickly. In the course of history, this is a blip, and everything will be fine. The 
Mexican experience was tremendously painful for the Mexican people on ev- 
ery level: economic, financial, social, and political. Having said this, the crisis 
was a very effective corrective mechanism that has made Mexico much health- 
ier than it might otherwise have been. 
The other risk is that the speed of transmission can accentuate the severity 
of  crises. I have  already argued that the opposite effect occurs. Derivatives 
reduce risk; securitization increases the return on capital; markets have greater 
power than those  with political agendas; and the net  result is more  stable 
growth and less volatility in worldwide markets. 
A number of key issues remain: 
1. To what extent are policymakers who accept this framework comfortable 
with the tendency of markets to overshoot? 
2.  Although the markets react very fast, the reaction time of the chief play- 
ers in a country in financial crisis is slower, which poses a risk that argues for 
some type of cushioning mechanism. 
3. There is often a difference between the strength of  universal banks and 
All Other and that of the national banks in the middle that are the transmission 
mechanism. For example, many Mexican banks had bad assets on their books 
when they were privatized and then proceeded to add more, with a compound- 
ing effect. In this case, the transmission mechanism was a weakness. 
4.  Portfolio diversification has a downside. Derivatives reduce risk because 
they diversify portfolios, but portfolio diversification also increases the possi- 
bility of  contagion. The issue of  moral hazard has been very carefully de- 
scribed by Mervyn King, but I want to bring up one issue that relates to Qure- 
shi’s point about the subsidy implicit in guarantees. We  believe that it would 
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FDIC guarantee to the U.S. banking system. Not only is the capital available, 
but it would be an economically rewarding proposition. Indeed, a proposal has 
even been submitted to Congress. The problem is that the banks don’t want it 
because their premiums in tough times would be higher than the subsidized 
price provided by the government. And government officials don’t want it be- 
cause they like the control. But it could be done. 
5. Finally, there is a potential source of  tension between this mobility of 
capital, which is almost instantaneous, and the much lower degree of mobility 
of labor, which causes trade friction. 
My final comment relates to the future of banks. Banks in the first category, 
universal banks, and banks in the third category, All Other, have a very bright 
future. They will be the custodians of intellectual capital, segmenting and dis- 
tributing risk more efficiently than their competitors. And they will marry that 
capital with the benefits of technology. That mix has potential for excitement, 
profits, and a contribution to less volatility. 
With respect to the point about reduction versus redistribution of risk, I would 
respectfully stand by the point that derivative markets redistribute and reduce 
risk.’ The reason is that risk is not an ethereal, stand-alone concept. Risk is a 
function of particular cash flows associated with that risk and of how the risk 
correlates with other risks belonging to its owner. The argument would be that 
more efficient redistribution puts risk in the hands of investors for whom that 
particular risk, while in and of itself very risky, might reduce the overall risk 
of their portfolios. The classic example: Does it make sense for an investment 
trust that only holds AAA bonds to acquire a catastrophic reinsurance contract? 
If it’s completely unrelated, the likely answer is yes. That’s an extreme case. 
As to Kathryn Dominguez’s point, I think that what happened in 1987 was 
a portfolio problem. Most of the things we do work in practice but not in the- 
ory. That one worked in theory but not in practice because of the gapping prob- 
lem. This is not an indictment of  derivatives but of  a particular application, 
which, in retrospect, missed a fairly obvious danger. 
Now,  to speak to the debate we’ve been having about information. David 
Mullins whispered to me the same point I’m about to make. With hindsight, it 
is very easy to know what information made it obvious that a crisis was going 
to occur in Thailand or that the peso was overvalued. It was not so obvious at 
the time. There was lots of information swirling around-and  lots of people 
who, while they might have thought something was going to happen in Thai- 
land, didn’t know when, and the “when” is as important as the “if.” Many of 
those same people lost money in Thailand, and also took a hit in the 1980s. 
On whether the provision of liquidity by the Fed is a sine qua non for the 
proliferation of these instruments: The answer  is, Z don’t know. I would say that 
the Fed’s role of providing liquidity is a very good thing. Also, the Fed makes 
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money, as does the Bank of England, so it’s not as if it were a charitable activ- 
ity. I was in no sense arguing against the Fed’s  providing liquidity. Nor was I 
arguing against regulation. Indeed, I think that entities that create systemic risk 
need to be regulated. 
With respect to the question of why we don’t give up our banking license, I 
recognize that I can be accused of  currying favor. William McDonough’s re- 
sponse to the question eloquently describes why we like being regulated by 
the Fed. 
With respect to the point about moral hazard, I agree with every single com- 
ment made except the last one: the problem with bonds is that you can’t get all 
of  these bondholders together and compel them to do something. That is not 
the problem with bond financing. On the contrary, that is the benejit of bond 
financing. It is precisely because of  that feature that borrowers are going to 
think very carefully before defaulting. It prods them to put themselves in a 
position not to default in the first place. Up until now, banks have been quite 
unintelligent in the way  that they have lent money. They have lent in such a 
way that allows them to be herded into a room and told what to do. I predict 
that won’t be the case in the future. The commercial banking system is simply 
not going to make long-term, next-to-lender-of-last-resort commitments and 
loans to governments with clauses in them that don’t allow the loan to be trans- 
ferred. Instead, they’re going to use liquid instruments with a secondary mar- 
ket, and therefore the nature of these instruments is going to be the same as 
that of bonds. Over time, this will be a market force leading to more virtuous 
behavior. 
Can there be blips along the way? And can some countries completely de- 
fault and be excluded from the markets? Yes, and it’s happened to some coun- 
tries already, Peru being one. And Peru came back fine. It was just very painful. 
Discussion Summary 
David Folkerts-Landau noted that the growth and functioning of  derivative 
markets in the United States depends on the cooperation of  the Federal Re- 
serve. Through their provision of liquidity and in their smoothing of overnight 
rates, policymakers at the Federal Reserve are complicit in the growth of these 
markets. As evidence of this, Folkerts-Landau noted that the Bundesbank is not 
prepared to take such actions in the overnight markets, and, as a consequence, 
derivative markets in Germany are considerably smaller. He also noted that, 
consequently, maintaining a banking license in the United States is extremely 
important even if typical commercial banking functions are less important to 
financial institutions. Peter Garber concurred and asked whether the massive 
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William McDonough agreed that because the U.S. dollar remains the major 
reserve currency, the actions of  the New York Federal Reserve are crucial to 
the functioning of derivative markets and that these services are provided at a 
modest cost. He went on to highlight the major issues facing financial regula- 
tors today. While a number of industries have combined into the financial ser- 
vices industry, regulation is still fragmented in an anachronistic manner. In 
order to remedy this disjunction, McDonough proposed an umbrella supervi- 
sor that would regulate any institution that could create or reallocate risk. Such 
an umbrella supervisor would tailor capital requirements for a financial institu- 
tion in the context of the specific business strategy and risk appetite of  that 
institution. Such an approach would represent a step toward risk-based capital 
requirements. These decisions would be made on the basis of regular, detailed 
discussions with the CEOs of these institutions that would include discussions 
of  capital adequacy and management succession. These umbrella regulators 
would need to be particularly firm when questions of  integrity or the break- 
down of internal control became apparent. 
McDonough also noted that while financial services firms manage their 
books on a global basis, regulation continues to be segmented by legal jurisdic- 
tion. In a related vein, he considered the too-big-to-fail doctrine pernicious and 
suggested that any institution can be deflated. He noted, however, that such an 
approach requires a robust payments system to ensure the elimination of Her- 
statt risk. Efforts are under way that will result in the elimination within two 
years of such intraday settlement risk. 
To the questions raised by  Mervyn King’s comments, Andrew Crockett re- 
sponded that the emphasis on individual banks is still necessary because sys- 
temic risk is still a function of the risk of the individual institutions. He also 
noted that while risk exposure does extend beyond the banking sector, banks 
remain the key players and consequently must remain the center of  supervi- 
sion. Finally, Crockett noted that penalizing lenders who had made imprudent 
loans should be a central aspect of the resolution of these crises. Gurber asked 
King specifically about the twenty-five suggested bank standards and their ap- 
plicability in the emerging market context. 
Mervyn King concurred with McDonough’s emphasis on payments systems 
and settlement risk. Regarding the creation of umbrella supervisory agencies, 
he agreed that as the financial services industry expands, creating regulations 
that don’t distort firms’ incentives is a top priority. King noted, however, that 
the most important obstacle to such umbrella agencies is bureaucratic and po- 
litical resistance from existing regulators reluctant to cede control. He also 
suggested that in order to meet the challenges of the changing industry, regula- 
tors must move from an emphasis on the specifics of regulations to more blue- 
sky thinking. 
Rent? Stulz alluded to the instructive example of Switzerland in considering 
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avoided major banking crises not because of better supervision but because of 
the absence of implicit or explicit guarantees in the banking system. 
Nicholas Stem voiced concern that the current spreads on loans to eastern 
Europe may not fully reflect the existing risks in the region. He noted that the 
question for regulators is whether, and how, to voice such concerns. In particu- 
lar, Stem asked whether it is appropriate for supervisory agencies to voice such 
concerns quietly or loudly, and privately or publicly. 
Stanley Fischer responded that the moral hazard aspect of these crises, while 
receiving increasing attention, is often misunderstood. First, he rejected the 
notion that private lenders in the Thai crisis, whose losses may have been mini- 
mized by government actions, are an example of a moral hazard problem. By 
this criterion, Fischer noted that any countercyclical monetary policy would be 
characterized as creating a moral hazard problem. He stressed that the policy 
objective is to arrive at a sustainable exchange rate and avoid the deepening of 
the crisis. Second, Fischer noted that in contrast to bank lending to govem- 
ments, bondholders are much more difficult to coordinate. Furthermore, the 
covenants of these bonds include legal penalties that made moratoria on pay- 
ments very difficult to undertake. Martin Feldstein inquired about the nature of 
these penalties and what makes them so severe. Fischer responded that they in- 
clude seizure of property and restrictions on international trade and payments. 
King noted that the covenants referred to by Fischer are an example of the 
need for a multilateral approach through the G-7 or G-10. While no individual 
borrower could insist on the removal of such covenants in negotiations, a multi- 
lateral agreement would be the best way  to approach this issue. Similarly, 
greater information disclosure should be a focus of multilateral efforts as no 
individual country would necessarily undertake such steps. 
Regarding the ability of private markets to overcome crises, Fischer noted 
that any position that accepts that markets sometimes overshoot and that econ- 
omies and firms suffer from hysteresis cannot then automatically accept the 
prescription that private markets can solve these problems alone. 
With respect to the proliferation of  derivatives, Kathryn Dominguez noted 
that it was puzzling that Japanese firms, who could have been hedging against 
yen  appreciation, in fact did very little hedging. She noted that there is little 
debate about the benefits of derivatives in calm markets. Instead, the disagree- 
ment is about how they functioned during crises. 
Roberto Mendoza responded that derivatives both redistribute and reduce 
risk exposures and cited the inclusion of catastrophic reinsurance contracts in 
AAA portfolios as an example of the risk-reducing nature of  derivatives. He 
suggested that the performance of portfolio insurance during the 1987 crash 
was  not an  indictment of  derivatives in general but rather of  that particular 
application. He also suggested that the coordination problems of bondholders 
are precisely the reason countries will try to avoid default and, as such, are a 
positive development. 